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1 Introduction
The success of many economic endeavours depends on people’s ability to refrain from individually
profitable actions for the sake of the common good. Such collective action problems have the
key characteristic that, because individual actions have externalities on others, private and social
optima do not coincide. Key examples are the use of common property resources — where the
actions of individuals impose negative externalities on others, and the provision of public goods
— where the actions of individuals impose positive externalities on others.
In this paper we review the existing evidence and provide some new results on two aspects
of collective action problems. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behavior and
promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that
determine the degree to which they cooperate?
Most of our discussion will focus on collective action problems in developing countries. Insti-
tutional design has particular relevance in these countries both because formal institutions that
regulate the use of common resources and the provision of public goods are generally absent, and
because many of the world’s poorest individuals depend on these resources for their livelihood.
The management of forest resources, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems provide im-
portant examples of collective actions problems faced by the world’s poorest. Around one third
of the world’s population relies on firewood for energy (Edmonds 2002) and agriculture is the
main source of income for the majority of the world’s poor. In addition, forests, pastures and
irrigation systems are typically locally managed. In all these cases, the collective action problem
has two prongs. Extraction by one user creates a negative externality by reducing the amount
available to others, while investment into maintenance generates positive externalities for the
entire community.
Olson’s (1965) seminal work highlights that self-interested behavior precludes cooperation
when group rationality is in contradiction with individual rationality. Common resource man-
agement can therefore end up ‘tragically’, as Hardin (1968) put it, if each individual ignores the
negative externality that his extraction choices imposes on other group members. However, while
such pessimism may be justified in the case of anonymous and infrequent interactions, the folk
theorem suggests repeated interaction between the same individuals might increase the likelihood
of sustained cooperation in equilibrium. This is especially so if suﬃciently harsh and credible
punishments are available. Extensive socio-anthropological fieldwork indeed finds evidence that
some communities manage to create eﬀective informal institutions, namely rules that govern the
use of common resources and contributions to local public goods. Failure, however, occurs as
frequently as success.
We present evidence on successful institutions from two sources — field studies of common
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resource management and laboratory experiments. Several field studies indicate that successful
communities typically exhibit well-defined rules, the ability to monitor resource extraction and
to punish deviators, the existence of a mechanism for conflict resolution and of a forum for
discussions (Baland and Platteau 1996, Lam 1998, Ostrom 1990, Tang 1992, Wade 1988).
The experimental evidence from common resource and public good games is remarkably con-
sistent with the insights of field studies. For example, the ability to monitor and to communicate
(even without commitment) is typically found to foster cooperation. In addition, both mon-
etary and non-monetary punishments to deviators and rewards to compliers increase levels of
cooperation (Cardenas 2003, Fehr and Gachter 2000, Ledyard 1995, Masclet et al 2003).
The second aspect of collective action problems we discuss relates to the characteristics of com-
munities that are able to sustain cooperative behavior. Recent evidence from cross-community
comparisons indicates that some community characteristics are systematically correlated with the
ability to cooperate. In particular, heterogeneity along the lines of ethnicity, religion and social
class is generally found to be detrimental to cooperation. The eﬀect of other characteristics such
as wealth inequality and community size is less clear-cut, although in general both inequality and
community size seem to reduce cooperation (Baland et al 2001, Banerjee et al 2001, Banerjee et
al 2004, Bardhan 2000, Dayton-Johnson 2000, Gugerty and Miguel 2004, Khwaja 2003).
In cross-community comparisons, however, the identification of the causal eﬀect of community
characteristics on cooperation is hindered by the presence of unobservable community variables.
In addition, the extent to which groups cooperate may itself drive selection or migration into
those communities, aﬀecting the community’s characteristics.
Here we address these issues using individual level panel data to analyze cooperation among
Eastern European workers employed by a UK farm to pick fruit. Workers are paid according to a
relative incentive scheme, namely individual pay depends on the ratio of individual productivity
to the average productivity of the group of co-workers. Individual eﬀort thus imposes a negative
externality on all co-workers by raising average productivity and lowering co-workers’ pay, other
things equal. In this context, higher individual productivity corresponds to less cooperative
behavior, as the social optimum is for all workers to exert the lowest feasible eﬀort level.
We are able to identify the eﬀect of group characteristics on the cooperative behavior of
individuals by comparing the behavior of the same individual when they are exogenously assigned
to diﬀerent groups of co-workers.
Moreover, we also observe the same workers working under an absolute incentive scheme
— piece rates. This incentive scheme, where the pay of a worker depends only on their own
productivity, provides no reason for workers to choose their eﬀorts cooperatively. Hence by
analyzing the eﬀect of group characteristics on the productivity of the same individual under
relative incentives and piece rates, we are able to separate the eﬀect of these group characteristics
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on cooperation from their eﬀect on productivity per se.
The paper is organized into 5 sections. Section 2 reviews field studies and experimental
evidence on the institutions that promote cooperation. Section 3 reviews the existing cross
sectional evidence on the community characteristics that favour cooperation. Section 4 presents
new evidence from the results of our study. In the concluding section we draw together some
policy implications and point to avenues for future research.
2 Institutions for Collective Action
That some communities manage to cooperate while others fail naturally raises the question of
whether the diﬀerence is driven by community level institutions. Some light has been shed on
this by field studies of common property resources and results from experiments that recreate
collective action problems in the laboratory.
Several extensive field analyses of common resource management have identified a common
set of institutional features that promote long-lasting cooperation. First, clear and detailed rules
that govern the sharing of costs and benefits from the resource must be agreed upon by all
participants. Second, congruence is a key requirement, namely, the share of costs borne by each
participant should be proportionate to the share of benefits they derive from the resource. Third,
monitoring is essential. Fourth, credible sanctions for deviators should be established ex-ante
and punishment should be made public. Fifth, there must be a forum to resolve conflicts and
discuss changes in rules to adapt to external changes. Namely, good institutions have in-built
mechanisms to ensure their successful evolution.1
Recent advances in the collection of detailed micro data in developing countries have promoted
the use of statistical analysis to complement the case study evidence. Bardhan (2000) analyses
data from 48 irrigation systems in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. He finds that systems are
better maintained when guards are hired to monitor and punish deviators, and when costs are
shared in proportion to the size of landholdings rather than equally divided among all users. Rule
fairness is also the single most important determinant of canal maintenance status in Dayton—
Johnson’s (2000) study of 51 irrigation system in Mexico.
Overall, the field evidence indicates that institutions do play a key role for solving collective
action problems, and highlights a common set of institutions that appear to be conducive to
cooperation. However, since good institutional features often appear together it is diﬃcult to
1In her seminal work, Ostrom (1990) compares the performance of 14 diverse common pool resources ranging
from Swiss pastures to Indonesian irrigation systems. Further case study evidence can be found in Tang’s (1992)
analysis of irrigation systems around the world; in Agrawal’s (1984) analysis of forest management in Himalayan
villages; in Lam’s (1998) study of irrigation systems in Nepal; and in Wade’s (1987) study of communal grazing
grounds and irrigation canals across villages in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh.
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assess the relative importance of each feature on its own. In addition, the causal eﬀect of
institutions on cooperation cannot easily be identified from cross-community data given that the
variation in institutional structure might itself be endogenous due to the potential relevance of
unobservable community characteristics.
While exogenous institutional changes are rarely observed in the data, they can be, and
have been, produced in laboratory experiments that mimic common pool management and the
provision of public goods.2 In the baseline set-up, a group of subjects plays the same game
simultaneously, anonymously and repeatedly for a predetermined number of rounds. Subjects
cannot see each other nor do they have information on other players’ actions. At the end of each
round, players learn the aggregate outcome and choose how much to invest in the public good
or common pool resource in the next round.
Subjects’ behavior in this set-up follows a consistent pattern in a myriad of experiments.
In the initial rounds subjects cooperate to some extent so that the outcome is roughly halfway
between the self-interested equilibrium and the group optimum. Cooperation falls sharply as
the game is repeated and generally by the last few rounds the majority of subjects choose the
self-interested equilibrium.3
Exogenous changes in the rules of the game allows researchers to assess the impact of in-
stitutional features such as communication, monetary punishments, and informal sanctions on
cooperation levels.
Cooperation improves when subjects are allowed to communicate at the beginning of the game
and it increases even further if they are allowed to communicate at the end of each round. When
available, discussion transcripts indicate that subjects used the opportunity to communicate to
calculate the optimal group strategy and to agree on a set of rules to achieve the group optimum.
Subjects also used verbal sanctions to punish deviators (Cardenas 2003, Ostrom et al 1994).
The ability to punish also increases cooperation and its eﬀect is stronger if the same subjects
play the game repeatedly as opposed to being matched with diﬀerent people in each round.
However, since subjects must pay a fee to inflict punishment, the ability to punish often reduces
group welfare because punishment costs are larger than the gains from increased cooperation.
The combination of punishment and communication on the other hand, dramatically improves
2The fact that subjects of laboratory experiments are generally undergraduate students who self select into
participating raises the issue of whether experimental results have external validity. Recent studies have enrolled
subjects from diﬀerent backgrounds to investigate diﬀerences in behavior (Gachter et al 2004, List 2004a). Re-
latedly, List (2004b) provides evidence to compare how the same individuals behave in the market place and in
the laboratory. For a review of these issues see Harrison and List (2004).
3Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) meta-study of public goods experiments shows that in the initial stages of the
game, contribution levels are typically 40 to 60 % of the initial endowment. In the final periods however, 73%
of all participants choose to contribute nothing to the public good with the other players also exhibiting low
contribution levels. Ledyard (1995) also provides a review of this extensive literature.
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eﬃciency (Fehr and Gachter 2000, Ostrom et al 1994).
Masclet et al 2003 show that non-monetary sanctions, whereby subjects are allowed to dis-
pense ‘disapproval’ points, which do not lower their or the recipients’ monetary payoﬀ, also
foster cooperation. Finally, the introduction of rewards, which decrease the monetary payoﬀ of
the giver and increase the receiver’s, also foster cooperation albeit to a lesser extent than mone-
tary punishment. Higher cooperation is achieved when monetary rewards and punishments can
be used jointly (Andreoni 2003, Sefton et al 2001).
3 Group Determinants of Cooperation
The second question we address deals with the community characteristics that promote cooper-
ative behavior. We briefly review the empirical literature while the next section presents new
evidence from our recent study. Given space constraints, we forsake a fully comprehensive survey
in favour of a small selection of studies that highlight the key issues, both methodological and
substantive, for developing countries. The evidence we review relates to a variety of collective
action problems, at diﬀerent levels of geographical aggregation and across diﬀerent continents.
All of these studies present evidence on the three community characteristics that have received
most attention in this literature, namely socio-ethnic heterogeneity, income and asset inequal-
ity, and community size. In addition, the studies reviewed, in line with most of the literature
in general, use cross-community variation to identify the eﬀect of community characteristics on
cooperation. An exception to this is Banerjee et al (2001) who use panel data to study the eﬀect
of variation in wealth inequality within Indian districts on institutional performance.
3.1 Ethnic Fragmentation and Social Heterogeneity
The theoretical literature has identified several reasons why the social composition of a com-
munity might aﬀect its ability to provide public goods or manage common resources. The key
distinction is between communities that are homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, religion and social
class and communities that are not.
First, socially homogeneous communities might be better at solving collective action problems
because all members have similar tastes, whereas heterogenous communities find it hard to agree
on the characteristics of the common good and are therefore less likely to cooperate in its provision
(Alesina et al 1999, Esteban and Ray 1999).
Second, individuals might simply dislike working with others outside their group, thus making
cooperation less likely in heterogeneous communities (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000).
Third, the diﬀerent groups in heterogeneous communities might disagree on how to share the
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private benefits associated with collective action, or value less the benefits accruing to members
of the other groups (Vigdor 1994, Banerjee et al 2004).
Finally, social heterogeneity might undermine the ability to devise mechanisms that sustain
cooperation. For instance, if social sanctions are eﬀective within but not across diﬀerent groups,
heterogeneous communities are less likely to be able to use sanctions as an enforcement mecha-
nism (Gugerty and Miguel 2004).
The existing empirical evidence provides some support to the idea that heterogeneity hampers
cooperation in the provision of local public goods and in the management and maintenance of
common property resources.4
Banerjee et al (2004) show that heterogeneity along caste and religious lines is associated
with lower local public goods provision across 391 Indian districts. The share of villages with
schools, public transport and electricity is significantly lower in more heterogeneous districts. The
provision of communication and health facilities is uncorrelated to the level of heterogeneity while
water facilities — such as wells and hand pumps — are more likely to be found in heterogeneous
districts. The latter finding might indicate that there is some substitution across diﬀerent public
goods, or it might be a symptom of social disunity to the extent that people do not want to
share water in particular, with others outside of their own social group.
Evidence from more disaggregated data also indicates that heterogeneity is correlated with
lower contributions to local public goods. Using cross-sectional data on 84 schools in Kenya,
Gugerty and Miguel (2004) show that in areas that are more fragmented along ethnic lines,
monetary contributions to the local school are lower. Interestingly, the amount collected through
school fees is of equal size in homogeneous and heterogeneous areas. In the latter, however,
voluntary contributions given at public fund-raising events are significantly lower. The estimates
indicate that, other things equal, eliminating heterogeneity would raise contributions by 20%.
Importantly, lower funding has a real impact in Kenyan schools. Ethnic heterogeneity is indeed
negatively correlated with several measures of infrastructure quality and with the availability
of textbooks. However, it is harder to assess whether this translates into worse educational
outcomes as Gugerty and Miguel (2004) find little or no eﬀect on test scores.
A related strand of the literature analyzes the eﬀect of community characteristics on the
management of common property resources. Baland et al (2001) use cross-sectional data from
215 rural communities in Nepal to investigate extraction decisions of firewood from the common
forest. They find that extraction levels are significantly higher in villages that are more hetero-
geneous along the lines of caste and ethnicity. The estimates indicate that, other things equal,
4Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) model both the positive and negative aspects of heterogeneity on economic
performance, and review recent studies on the eﬀect of ethnic fragmentation and social heterogeneity on public
goods provision in the United States and economic performance across countries.
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eliminating heterogeneity altogether would reduce firewood collection by 17%.
Bardhan’s (2000) study of 48 irrigation systems in Tamil Nadu reveals that the probability
of conflict about water use is significantly higher in villages where there is no dominant caste,
but caste heterogeneity has no significant eﬀect on the frequency with which water allocation
rules are broken.
Finally, other studies look at the maintenance of common assets, a collective action problem
that shares elements of both the provision of public goods and the extraction from common
resources. In his study of irrigation systems in Mexico, Dayton-Johnson (2000) finds that social
heterogeneity, measured as the number of diﬀerent groups using the same irrigation system, is
negatively correlated with the system’s maintenance status. Similarly, Khwaja (2003) shows
that heterogeneity along clan, political, and religious lines is negatively correlated with the
maintenance status of common infrastructure projects across 91 communities in Pakistan.
Overall the existing findings indicate that heterogeneity along caste, religious or ethnic lines
is correlated with lower contributions to public goods, higher extraction levels from common
resources and poorer maintenance of common infrastructure. That notwithstanding, evidence on
the mechanisms through which social heterogeneity aﬀects cooperation remains scarce. Gugerty
and Miguel’s (2004) analysis of school committee minutes provide some support to the claim that
social sanctions are less eﬀective across diﬀerent ethnic groups. In their data, schools located
in more ethnically homogeneous areas were more likely to impose sanctions on low contributors.
Using data from Indian districts, Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) show that heterogeneity is
correlated to political fragmentation. In heterogeneous districts more candidates run for the
State Assembly and the share of votes for the winning party is lower. This, in turn, lends some
support to the hypothesis that diﬀerent ethnic groups have diﬀerent preferences.5
3.2 Asset Inequality and the Distribution of Net Benefits
Asset or income inequality might aﬀect collective action for two reasons. First, to the extent
that inequality generates distinct group identities such as social classes, increasing inequality is
akin to increasing the level of social heterogeneity which aﬀects cooperation as discussed above.6
Second, asset inequality is often related to the distribution of benefits from the provision of the
public good or conservation of the common resource. For instance, large landholders are more
likely to benefit from investment in common irrigation systems because large holdings use more
5Duflo and Chattopadhyay (2004) and Pande (2003) show that in India mandated political representation of
women and scheduled castes, at the local and state level respectively, shifts the composition of public spending
towards public goods that are more heavily used by these groups.
6La Ferrara (2003) provides some evidence that people of diﬀerent wealth classes do not mix. Using household
data from rural Tanzania, she finds that asset inequality at the village level reduces the likelihood that households
belong to economic groups.
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water.
Theoretically the eﬀect of inequality is ambiguous and largely depends on the characteristics
of the good in question. With increasing returns to scale due to large fixed costs, inequality can
favour collective action. This is Olson’s (1965) well known argument that if a single individual
reaps a suﬃciently large share of the benefits he would be willing to bear the full cost of the
public good.7 The presence of market imperfections and decreasing returns to productive assets,
however, can generate the opposite result, namely aggregate contributions decrease as the level
of inequality increases (Bardhan et al 2001). Moreover, to the extent that the distribution of
assets determines the level of control each member has over the common good, inequality might
favour rent seeking and reduce eﬃciency (Banerjee et al 2001).
Three of the studies reviewed above, present evidence on the relationship between asset
(land) inequality and collective action. The balance of evidence indicates that land inequality
is negatively correlated with maintenance status for irrigation systems (Bardhan 2000, Dayton-
Johnson 2000) and for infrastructure projects (Khwaja 2003). In all cases the relationship is
non-linear; the eﬀect is weaker at higher levels of inequality. However, Baland et al (2001)
find no correlation between income inequality and firewood collection in their study of Nepalese
villages.
The evidence on the mechanisms that link asset inequality and collective action is somewhat
more mixed. Banerjee et al ’s (2001) results from Indian sugar cooperatives are consistent with the
hypothesis of rent-seeking by large landowners. Dayton-Johnson (2000) shows that communities
where the distribution of landholdings is unequal choose water allocation rules that favour the
rich while, to the contrary, Bardhan (2000) finds that more unequal communities choose fairer
rules. The results are not necessarily contradictory, both because the eﬀect of inequality might
be non-linear and because the measure of inequality — typically the Gini coeﬃcient — might not
capture all the relevant information on the income distribution.8
3.3 Group Size
An unresolved issue is whether small or large groups are more able to successfully cooperate in
collective action problems (see for example the discussion in Esteban and Ray 2001). Olson’s
(1965) argument in favour of small groups is actually a corollary of the eﬀect of inequality.
Namely small groups are more likely to be successful because the distribution of benefits is more
likely to be unequal and so as discussed above, it is more likely that there is some individual who
7Wade (1988) also stresses the importance of local elites in the provision of public goods in India.
8For instance, in the rent-seeking model of Banerjee et al (2001), increasing the share of small owners has two
eﬀects. On the one hand large owners have more resources to expropriate. On the other hand, small owners gain
control over the cooperative thus reducing rent-seeking opportunities.
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is willing to pay the full cost of the public good. Size, however, can also have direct eﬀects. On
the one hand, the institutional features that make collective action successful, such as monitoring,
are more easily implemented in small groups. On the other hand, there might be economies of
scale in large groups.
Of the studies reviewed above, only Bardhan (2000) finds a significant correlation between
group size and collective action. His evidence indicates that the negative eﬀects of group size on
cooperation prevail. In larger communities the maintenance status of irrigation systems is worse,
conflicts over water allocation are more frequent and rules are more likely to be broken. The
other studies find that group size has no significant eﬀect on cooperation, which may however
be because the positive and negative eﬀects of group size oﬀset each other.
4 New Evidence from the Field
Cross-community evidence clearly indicates a strong correlation between community character-
istics and measures of cooperation in collective action problems. However, four issues require
further attention.
First, causality is diﬃcult to establish given that the characteristics of interests are likely to
be correlated with other unobservables at the community level. Second, measuring the extent of
cooperation outside of the laboratory is limited by the diﬃculty in identifying the social optimum
in the data. For instance, while it is generally, and plausibly, assumed that higher contributions to
public goods indicate more cooperation, this is only true if provision is below the socially eﬃcient
level. Third, there is little evidence on the mechanism through which community characteristics
aﬀect collective action.9 In what follows we present new results from a field study that addresses
the first two issues (Bandiera et al 2005). The third is key to derive policy implications and is
discussed in Section 5.
4.1 Context and Data Description
We use panel data from the personnel records of a farm in the UK to analyze whether individuals
behave cooperatively in the workplace. The data records the daily productivity of farm workers
hired from a number of Eastern European countries. The workers’ main task is to pick fruit, and
picking takes place across a number of fields in the farm.
The rationale for cooperation derives from the pay scheme in place. Workers are paid ac-
cording to a relative incentive scheme, whereby individual pay depends on the ratio of individual
productivity to the average productivity of the group of co-workers on the same field and day.
9See Banerjee and Somathan (2001) for a discussion of this issue in the case of public good provision.
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Individual eﬀort thus imposes a negative externality on all co-workers by raising average pro-
ductivity and lowering co-workers’ pay, other things equal. In this context, the social optimum
is for all workers to exert the lowest feasible eﬀort level so that higher individual productivity
corresponds to less cooperation.
To be clear, under relative incentives workers face a compensation schedule of the form;
compensation = βKi (1)
where β is the picking rate and Ki is the total kilograms of fruit picked by worker i on the field
in the day. The picking rate β is endogenously determined by the average productivity of all
workers in the field on that day, where we define productivity y as the number of kilograms of
fruit picked per hour. In particular β is set according to;
β = wy (2)
where w is the minimum wage plus a positive constant fixed by the management at the beginning
of the season, and y is the average hourly productivity of all workers in the same field on the
same day. At the start of each field-day, the field supervisor announces an ex ante picking rate
based on her expectations of worker productivity. This picking rate is revised at the end of each
field-day to ensure a worker with productivity y earns the pre-established hourly wage, w.
Note that under relative incentives an increase in worker i’s eﬀort increases the average
productivity on the field-day and thus imposes a negative externality on her co-workers by
reducing the picking rate β in (2). The relative incentive scheme creates a wedge between
individual and group optima, thus providing a rationale for cooperation.
The data has three key features that allows us to identify the determinants of cooperative
behavior.
First, the same worker is assigned to diﬀerent groups of co-workers each day. We therefore
identify the eﬀect of group characteristics on individual productivity using variation in the pro-
ductivity of the same worker when working in diﬀerent groups, while controlling for unobserved
time invariant sources of individual heterogeneity that drive worker productivity.
Second, there is daily variation in group characteristics along dimensions that might aﬀect
cooperation, such as group size, the national composition of the group, heterogeneity of the group
in terms of costs of eﬀort and the personal stakes individuals have to behave cooperatively.
Third, piece rates replaced the relative incentive scheme midway through the season. Hence
we observe the daily productivity of the same individual when they are paid according to a
relative incentive scheme, and according to piece rates. Under piece rates, the compensation
11
schedule workers face is still given by (1), but now the picking rate is set exogenously at the
start of the day based on the supervisor’s expectation of productivity that field-day, and is not
revised.
Since there are no incentives for workers to cooperate under piece rates, analyzing the eﬀect of
group characteristics on the individual productivity of the same worker under relative incentives
and piece rates, allows us to separate the eﬀect of these group characteristics on cooperation
from their eﬀect on productivity per se.10
We use data on workers’ productivity for one type of fruit at the peak of the 2002 harvest
season, from mid-May until the end of August. We restrict the sample to only include workers
that pick for at least ten field-days under both relative incentives and piece rates. Individual
productivity is measured for each worker on each field and day they work. Our main sample
then contains 10215 worker-field-day level observations, covering 142 workers, 22 fields and 108
days in total.
Workers are hired on a casual basis, namely work is oﬀered daily with no guarantee of further
employment.11 Most workers in our sample are university students from eight diﬀerent countries
in Eastern and Central Europe. As a consequence, workers picking together on a given field-day
are generally from diﬀerent countries and the ethnic composition changes daily.12
Workers live and work on the farm together. They are housed in caravans, each hosting
between 4 and 6 workers. The organization of the workplace thus provides opportunities for
workers to build social ties with others. It also gives workers a variety of mechanisms by which
to make transfers or hand out punishments to others. A priori, we expect both factors to aﬀect
the ability of given group of co-workers to cooperate.
4.2 Descriptive Evidence
Table 1 shows that workers’ productivity rose significantly from an average of 5.01kg/hr under
relative incentives to 7.98kg/hr under piece rates, an unconditional increase of 59%.13 This
10If workers have ratchet concerns, namely if they think their current behavior can aﬀect the piece rate in the
future, there may be gains to them choosing their eﬀorts cooperatively under piece rates as well. Some features
of this work environment, however, make cooperation under piece rates unlikely. First, workers face uncertainty
over which fields they will be assigned to in the future. Second, workers are uncertain about the identity of their
future co-workers. In contrast, under relative incentives workers can observe the behavior and identity of the
relevant co-workers — those on the same field and day — that they have incentives to cooperate with.
11In order to qualify, individuals must be full-time university students aged between 19 and 25. Workers must
return to the same university in the Fall and have at least one year before graduation.
12The probability that on a given field—day, two randomly chosen workers are of diﬀerent nationalities is .67,
with a standard deviation of .14. Workers originate from Poland (46%), Bulgaria (13%), Russia (10%), Belarus
(10%), Ukraine (6%), Slovakia (6%), the Baltic Republics (4%), Romania (3%) and China (2%).
13In Bandiera et al (2005) we present evidence that this is a causal relationship — moving from relative incentives
to piece rates caused an increase in individual worker level productivity of at least 50%, other things equal. We
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suggests workers were less productive under the relative scheme, when they had incentives to
cooperate and reduce individual productivity, than under piece rates, when there are no reasons
to cooperate.
In Bandiera et al (2005) we show that this observed change in productivity is too large to
be reconciled with the assumption of non-cooperative behavior but too small to be reconciled
with the assumption of fully cooperative behavior. This suggests workers are able to cooperate
to some extent; on average, individual eﬀort is two thirds of the way between the individual
and the group optima. Moreover, the extent of cooperation varies equally across and within a
given worker through time, suggesting that the diﬀerence is not due to workers’ time invariant
characteristics.
Figure 1 shows kernel density estimates of worker productivity by each incentive scheme. The
productivity of each of the 142 workers in the sample is averaged within each incentive scheme in
this figure. The mean and variance of productivity both rise significantly moving from relative
incentives to piece rates. The figure highlights the considerable heterogeneity in productivity
across workers within an incentive scheme. Hence there is considerable variation in the extent
to which, on average, any given worker was cooperating under relative incentives. The empirical
analysis sheds light on what group characteristics determine the extent of this cooperation.
4.3 Empirical Method
We identify group characteristics that — (i) lead to more cooperation, and hence lower produc-
tivity, under relative incentives; and (ii) have no eﬀect on productivity under piece rates, where
there are no incentives to cooperate. This allows us to establish the group characteristics that
aﬀect productivity exclusively through their eﬀect on cooperative behavior.
We consider four group characteristics along which we observe variation each field-day. These
are the size of the group, and the heterogeneity of the group as defined along three dimensions
— nationality, ability, and stakes in the game.
To measure each worker’s innate ability, we first assume that eﬀort translates into productivity
through a Cobb—Douglas production function. We are then able to calibrate the first order
condition for workers’ eﬀort under piece rates and retrieve an estimate of each worker’s cost
of eﬀort, which is negatively related to their ability. The methodology we follow is detailed in
Bandiera et al (2005).
To proxy for the diﬀerence in stakes, we exploit the fact that some workers come to pick fruit
show this baseline result to be robust to a host of factors including natural trends in productivity at the field or
farm level over time, the endogenous allocation of workers to picking tasks over time, the endogenous attrition of
low yield fields, the anticipation of the change in incentives by workers, and the potential endogenous timing of
the change in incentives by management.
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as part of an internship programme that gives them credit in their home universities. Interns
have higher stakes in the sense that the cost of being caught shirking and sent home is higher
because academic punishment is added to the financial loss.
Denoting the productivity of worker i on field f on day t, yift, we estimate the following panel
data regression under each incentive scheme, where all continuous variables are in logarithms;
yift = αi + ϕf + γGft + δXift + ηZft + uift. (3)
Worker fixed eﬀects, αi, capture time invariant worker level determinants of productivity such
as innate ability, the value of their outside option, and intrinsic motivation. Field fixed eﬀects,
ϕf , capture time invariant field level determinants of productivity such as soil quality or plant
spacing. We also control for time varying factors at the individual (Xift) and field level (Zft).
These controls are worker’s picking experience, a linear time trend to capture farm level changes
over time, and measures of each field’s life cycle.14
The disturbance term, uift, captures unobserved determinants of productivity at the worker-
field-day level. Worker observations within the same field-day are unlikely to be independent
since workers face similar field conditions. This is accounted for by clustering standard errors at
the field-day level in all productivity regressions.
The group characteristic, Gft, varies at the field-day level. The parameter of interest through-
out is γ, which relates how variation in the group characteristic Gft aﬀects the productivity of the
same worker on the same field over time. A comparison of the estimates of γ under both incen-
tive schemes provides information on the diﬀerential eﬀect of Gft under relative incentives, when
there are incentives to cooperate, to that under piece rates, when the incentives to cooperate are
eliminated.
The number of workers allocated to a field varies both across fields, depending on the field
size, and within a given field through time, depending on the aggregate quantity of fruit on the
field on that given day. This in turn depends on the climate and the stage of its life cycle a field
is at. As reported in Table 1, group size on average is around 40, with a standard deviation of
23. This does not change across incentive schemes.
The composition of the group also varies each field-day. While workers are not randomly
assigned to fields, workers themselves do not choose who to work with. Rather group size and
composition are decided by the farm management, on the basis of the amount of fruit that needs
to be picked, the demand for workers to perform non—picking tasks, and how close workers live
relative to the fields that need to be picked.
14We measure the field’s life cycle as the number of days the field has been picked at any moment in time
divided by the total number of days that the field is picked. Picking experience is defined as the number of
field-days the worker has picked for.
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While workers’ allocation to groups might depend on information that is available to the
farm management and not available to the econometrician, we are able to isolate the eﬀect of
group characteristics on cooperation to the extent that the omitted variables are orthogonal to
the incentive scheme in place.
For instance, both group size and individual productivity are likely to be positively correlated
to the amount of fruit ready to be picked on a given field-day, and this is observable to the man-
agement but not to the econometrician. However, since the unobservable fruit stock determines
group size and productivity under both relative incentives and piece rates, if the estimated re-
lationship between group size and productivity were spuriously determined by the unobservable
fruit stock rather than by cooperation, group size should aﬀect productivity under both schemes.
Observing the same workers under relative incentives and piece rates then allows us to separate
the eﬀect of group composition on productivity through cooperation, which is only relevant under
the relative scheme, from the spurious eﬀect of unobservables that determine group composition
and productivity under both schemes.
Descriptive statistics for each group characteristic considered are reported in Table 1. With
the exception of the share of interns on the field, there is no significant diﬀerence between
relative incentives and piece rates in how workers are assigned to fields on the basis of the group
characteristics we consider.15
4.4 Empirical Results
Group Size
In Table 2 we present estimates of (3) by incentive scheme. The first group characteristic,
Gft, controlled for is group size — the number of workers that are picking on the field-day. This
is the set of workers that determine the average productivity, y, that endogenously determines
the picking rate under relative incentives as given in (2).
The result in Column 1a shows that under relative incentives, worker i’s productivity is
significantly higher on field-days in which she is working alongside more co-workers. The result
is thus consistent with the intuition that larger groups are less likely to cooperate because it is
more costly to establish and enforce cooperative agreements other things equal. Moreover, in
this context cooperation does not require paying fixed costs, so that the potential advantage of
larger groups does not materialize.
Under relative incentives, a one standard deviation increase in group size leads to a 13%
increase in productivity. In contrast, group size has no eﬀect on productivity for the same
15The reason why the share of interns is lower under piece rates (in the second half of the season) is that interns
tend to arrive earlier in the season.
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worker under piece rates, when there are no incentives to cooperate (Column 1b).
The result is not driven by diﬀerences in group size across incentive schemes, nor by a lack of
variation in group sizes under piece rates, as reported in Table 1. As with nearly all the results we
report, standard errors under piece rates are smaller than those under relative incentives. Hence
the non-significance of group characteristics under piece rates is not driven by these eﬀects being
imprecisely estimated.16
Next, we explore whether under relative incentives the eﬀect of group size on productiv-
ity is non-linear. To do this, we estimate the eﬀect of group size on individual productivity
semi-parametrically using the methodology of Hausman and Newey (1995). Figure 2 shows the
semi—parametric estimate of group size on individual productivity, where both are measured in
deviation from field means.17
Individual productivity is non-linearly related to group size. This implies the parametric
estimate reported in Column 1a underestimates the true marginal eﬀect of group size on pro-
ductivity under relative incentives. Workers’ productivity initially increases in group size, but in
suﬃciently large groups, the addition of an extra worker has no aﬀect on individual productivity.
The turning point in Figure 2 corresponds to a group size of between 30 and 45 workers.18
Heterogeneity 1: Nationality
We now analyze whether individuals are more able to cooperate with co-workers of the same
nationality than with others. Many nationalities are represented in our date, and the composition
of workers by nationality varies considerably across fields and days.
An increase of the share of workers of the same nationality as worker i can have two eﬀects
on cooperative behavior. First, as the national group of i becomes larger relative to others, they
are more able to determine the average productivity and hence the picking rate under relative
incentives, as given by (2). Moreover, as discussed in Section 3, individuals might internalize
the eﬀect of their action more if this hurts their co-nationals rather than other group members.
Hence worker i may cooperate more when she works alongside more of her co-nationals other
things equal.
Second, as the national group becomes larger in absolute terms, then in line with the previous
result on group size, worker i may cooperate less because the cost of making a cooperative
agreement within the national group increases.
16The results go against the hypothesis that larger groups are allocated to fields where productivity is expected
to be higher. If so, there should be a positive eﬀect of group size on productivity under both incentive schemes.
17This implies the eﬀect of group size further from the overall field mean is identified oﬀ field-days when a
greater number of workers are present. All field-days are used to identify the eﬀect around zero, hence the
confidence bands are tighter close to zero.
18The same turning point is identified via a spline regression of productivity on group size. The splines are
defined at intervals of size 15 and the eﬀect is of similar magnitude for all group sizes in splines 30-45 and above.
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To identify the two eﬀects separately the next specification controls for the share of all workers
on the field-day that are of the same nationality as worker i, and the number of workers of the
same nationality on the field-day.
Columns 2a and 2b of Table 2 report that conditional on the size of the national group, worker
i is significantly less productive (more cooperative) on field-days when the share of workers of
the same nationality is higher, and that this eﬀect is only present only under relative incentives.
Other things equal, a one standard deviation increase in the share of the national group reduces
productivity by 16% under relative incentives.19
Consistent with the previous result on group size as a whole, we find that conditional on
the share of all workers that are of the same nationality, an increase in the number of workers
of the same nationality leads to significantly higher productivity under relative incentives. A
one standard deviation increase in the number of workers of the same nationality increases
productivity by 25%, other things equal.
To summarize — (i) productivity is significantly lower when the share of all workers that
are of the same nationality increases, (ii) productivity is significantly higher when the number
of workers of the same nationality increases; (iii) the nationalities of co-workers only aﬀects
productivity under relative incentives.
Heterogeneity 2: Ability
In Table 3 we explore the relation between the heterogeneity of the group in terms of ability
and the extent of cooperation. Diﬀerences in ability determine diﬀerences in net benefits and
more able pickers might find deviations more attractive since the cost of exerting eﬀort is lower
for them. As discussed in Section 3, theory suggests more heterogeneous groups should be able
to cooperate less, other things equal.
We measure the heterogeneity of the group on a field-day using the standard deviation of
their cost of eﬀort, which is negatively related to their ability. We control for the mean cost of
eﬀort of workers on the field-day, so that increases in the standard deviation correspond to a
mean preserving spread in the costs of eﬀort of workers on the field-day.
Column 1a shows that on field-days when worker i picks among a more heterogeneous group
of workers, her productivity significantly increases under relative incentives. A one standard
deviation increase in heterogeneity increases individual productivity by 11%. Heterogeneity in
ability has no eﬀect on productivity under piece rates (Column 1b).
The next specification analyzes the behavior of the most able workers on a given field-day,
since these have the greatest incentives to break any cooperative agreement, other things equal.
We control for whether a given worker is among the bottom 5% of workers in terms of their
19These results are unchanged if we additionally control for the number of workers of other nationalities.
Furthermore, this variable has no significant eﬀect on productivity under either incentive scheme.
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cost of eﬀort. Importantly, since group composition changes daily, our measure varies within the
same individual over time. The result in Column 2a shows that when worker i is in the bottom
tail of the cost distribution, her productivity significantly increases by 23% above that when she
is not in the bottom tail.
The sign of this eﬀect is consistent with workers deviating from cooperative agreements when
it is most profitable for them to do so. The magnitude of the eﬀect corresponds to an extra $15
in daily earnings, which, at the UK minimum wage, corresponds to two and a half hours of work.
Under the assumption that deviators are punished, this amount provides an indication of the
upper bound on the monetary value of the punishment.
In Column 3a we control for whether worker i is in the top 5% of the cost distribution on
the field-day. We find that workers do not change their behavior relative to days when they are
not in the top 5%. This is consistent with these workers have the weakest incentives to break
cooperative agreements.
Columns 2b and 3b show that individual productivity does not depend on the position of
worker i in the cost distribution on a given field-day when working under piece rates. The
findings thus confirm that in the absence of any reason to choose eﬀorts cooperatively, there is
no evidence that workers behave as if they have incentives to break cooperative agreements.
Heterogeneity 3: Stakes
Table 4 analyzes whether the extent to which workers cooperate depends on the share of co-
workers present with exogenously higher stakes. To do so, we exploit the fact that some workers
come to work on an internship programme as part of their university course. They face higher
costs of being caught shirking and sent home. Therefore interns should cooperate less compared
to non-interns, other things equal. Moreover, the presence of interns on the field-day also lowers
the returns to cooperation for workers who are not on the programme themselves.
We estimate specification (3) by incentive scheme, where we control for the share of co-workers
that are interns on the field-day.
Column 1a shows that the productivity of all workers significantly increases, and thus coop-
eration decreases, when the share of interns increases. Column 2a shows that the productivity
of non-interns significantly increases as a greater share of workers present are on the internship
programme. In short, the presence of those that have fewer incentives to cooperate aﬀects the
behavior of other workers who would normally cooperate to a larger extent — an increase in one
standard deviation in the share of interns, increases the productivity of other workers by 23%.
Columns 1b and 2b repeat the analysis under piece rates and show that, in line with the inter-
pretation that the share of interns determines productivity only through its eﬀect on cooperation,
the presence of interns has no eﬀect on the productivity of others under piece rates.
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4.5 Summary
We have presented new evidence on the relationship between the characteristics of a group of
workers, and the ability of that group to cooperate. There are some particular features of our
setting and data that allow us to precisely identify the eﬀect of group characteristics on the
cooperative behavior of individuals.
First, there is a clear relation between observed individual behavior and cooperation. In
particular, since under relative incentives the group optimum is to exert the minimum feasible
level of eﬀort, lower individual productivity corresponds to more cooperative behavior, other
things equal. Second, the composition of the group of co-workers changes daily, and for reasons
that are exogenous to the behavior of individuals in the past. Third, we observe the same
individuals also working under piece rates when there are no incentives to cooperate. We can
therefore separate out the direct eﬀects of group characteristics on productivity, from the eﬀects
of group characteristics on cooperation.
We find that a given worker cooperates more, namely her productivity is significantly lower
under relative incentives, when — (i) she works in smaller groups; (ii) when the share of co-workers
of the same nationality is higher; (iii) the group is more homogeneous in terms of their ability
(or distribution of net benefits); and, (iv) when she works alongside more co-workers that have
less to lose from being caught shirking. None of these group characteristics are found to aﬀect
productivity under piece rates, when there is no reason for workers to behave cooperatively.
These results are in line with the cross sectional evidence reviewed in Section 3.
5 Outstanding Policy Issues
We have reviewed a large body of evidence from field studies, cross sectional analyses, and ex-
periments that indicates individuals can sometimes cooperate despite the profitability of oppor-
tunistic behavior. This body of research has provided clear insights into the design of institutions
that foster cooperation, and of the characteristics of communities that are better able at solving
collective action problems.
An important set of unresolved questions relate to the policy interventions that can resolve
cooperation failures. Some of the existing evidence leads to pessimism on the chances of pol-
icy fostering cooperation. Field studies often suggest that government involvement is correlated
with collective action failures and that spontaneous community participation is the only key
to success.20 While the importance of community participation is indisputable, the interpreta-
20For instance, of the 47 irrigation systems surveyed by Tang (1992), those that are government operated
perform worse than those that are locally operated. Similarly, Bardhan (2000) finds that government management
or the perception that allocation rules were decided by elites, leads to worse maintenance of infrastructure and a
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tion given to these findings is, in cases, too pessimistic. After all, government involvement is
endogenous and might be partly determined by the same factors that make collective actions
unsuccessful. In particular, if formal authority intervenes only when informal institutions fail,
the poorer performance of government projects is at least partly due to the same factors that
made collective action fail in the first place.21
Our research contributes to the policy debate by providing evidence on how group charac-
teristics relate to institutions and the success of collective action. This is especially important
given that many community characteristics — such as ethnic heterogeneity — cannot be changed
by public policy, while policy may be able to aﬀect their link with cooperation.
For instance, our finding that individuals cooperate less when they are heterogeneous in terms
of the costs and benefits of cooperation provide a rationale for policy measures or project design
features to even out extreme diﬀerences among individuals or to set up a system of compensatory
transfers. Similarly, the finding that smaller groups cooperate more would justify, for instance,
the organization of larger communities into smaller subgroups that interact with each other
through representatives.
Some suggestive evidence indicates that project design can undo the potentially detrimental
eﬀects of ethnic heterogeneity on collective action. Khwaja (2003) indeed shows that socially
heterogeneous communities are able to properly maintain projects that require labour rather
than monetary contributions, possibly because the latter can be expropriated while the former
cannot.
The final key issue for policy is whether cooperation is persistent, namely whether success
in one collective action problem facilitates cooperation in other similar situations. For example,
Henrich et al ’s (2001) field study of 15 small-scale ‘societies’ shows that the degree of cooperation
in experimental games is correlated with the structure of everyday social interactions within the
group of subjects. Societies that rely on cooperation for their daily livelihood exhibit a higher
degree of cooperation in experiments. Cardenas (2003) also shows that individuals who are less
likely to interact and cooperate in their everyday life cooperate less in experimental games.
Assessing whether cooperation is self-enforcing is of tremendous importance to correctly eval-
uate the net benefits of policy measures intended to foster cooperation at the community level.
Indeed, to the extent that the ability to cooperate on one project makes future cooperation
easier, one-oﬀ policy interventions can have a sustained long-term impact.
higher probability of conflict.
21To this date there have been few systematic evaluations of policy measures designed to foster cooperation in
collective action problems. One exception is Edmonds (2002) who evaluates a nationwide community forestry pro-
gramme in Nepal. The balance of evidence indicates that government initiated community groups did significantly
reduce the extraction of firewood.
20
References
[1] agrawal.a (1994) “Rules, Rule Making and Rule Breaking: Examining the Fit Between
Rule Systems and Resource Use” in Ostrom.E, Gardner.R, and Walker.J.M (eds.), Rules,
Games, and Common-pool Resources, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: Michigan.
[2] alesina.a and e.la ferrara (2000) “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115: 847-904.
[3] alesina.a and e.la ferrara (2004) Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance, mimeo,
Harvard University.
[4] andreoni.j, w.harbaugh and l.vesterlund (2003) “The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards,
Punishments, and Cooperation”, American Economic Review 93: 893-902.
[5] baland.j and j.p.platteau (1996) Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a
Role for Rural Communities?, Oxford: Food and Agriculture Organization and Clarendon
Press.
[6] baland.j, p.bardhan, s.das, d.mookherjee, and r.sarkar (2000) “Inequality, Col-
lective Action and the Environment: Evidence from Firewood Collection in Nepal”, in
Baland.J, P.Bardhan and S.Bowles (eds.), Inequality, Collective Action and Environmental
Sustainability, Russell Sage Foundation & Princeton University Press.
[7] bandiera.o, i.barankay, and i.rasul (2005) "Social Preferences and the Response to
Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data", forthcoming Quarterly Journal of Economics
[8] banerjee.a and r.somanathan (2001) Caste, Community and Collective Action: The
Political Economy of Public Good Provision in India, mimeo, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
[9] banerjee.a, d.mookherjee, k.munshi, and d.ray (2001) “Inequality, Control Rights
and Eﬃciency: A Study of Sugar Cooperatives inWesternMaharashtra”, Journal of Political
Economy 109: 138-90.
[10] banerjee.a, l.iyer, and r.somanathan (2004) History, Social Divisions and Public
Goods in Rural India, mimeo Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
[11] bardhan.p.k (2000) “Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation
Communities in South India”, Economic Development and Cultural Change 48: 847-65.
21
[12] bardhan.p, m.ghatak and a.karaivanov (2002) “Inequality, Market Imperfections, and
the Voluntary Provision of Collective Goods”, in Baland.J, P.Bardhan and S.Bowles (eds.),
Inequality, Collective Action and Environmental Sustainability, Russell Sage Foundation &
Princeton University Press.
[13] bohnet.i and b.s.frey (1999). “The Sound of Silence in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator
Games”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 38: 43-57.
[14] cardenas.j.c (2003) “Real Wealth and Experimental Cooperation: Experiments in the
Field Lab”, Journal of Development Economics 70: 263-89.
[15] dayton-johnson.j (2000) “Determinants of Collective Action on the Local Commons: A
Model with Evidence from Mexico”, Journal of Development Economics 62: 181-208.
[16] duflo.e and r.chattopadhyay (2004) “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a
Randomized Policy Experiment in India”, Econometrica 72: 1409-43.
[17] edmonds.e (2002) “Government Initiated Community Resource Management and Local
Resource Extraction from Nepal’s Forests”, Journal of Development Economics 68: 89-115.
[18] esteban.j and d.ray (2001) “Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox”, American
Political Science Review 95: 663-72.
[19] esteban.j and d.ray (1999) “Conflict and Distribution”, Journal of Economic Theory
87: 379-415.
[20] fehr.e and k.m.schmidt (1999) “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation”,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817-68.
[21] fehr.e and s.gachter (2000) “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experi-
ments”, American Economic Review 90: 980-94.
[22] gachter.s, b.herrmann, and c.thoni (2004) “Trust, Voluntary Cooperation, and Socio-
economic Background: Survey and Experimental Evidence”, forthcoming Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior & Organization.
[23] gugerty.m.k, and e.miguel (2004) “Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public
Goods in Kenya”, forthcoming Journal of Public Economics.
[24] harrison.g and j.list (2004) “What Constitutes a Field Experiment in Economics?”,
forthcoming Journal of Economic Literature.
22
[25] hardin.g (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science, 162: 1243-8.
[26] hausman.j.a and w.k.newey (1995) “Nonparametric Estimation of Exact Consumers
Surplus and Deadweight Loss”, Econometrica 63: 1445-76.
[27] henrich. j et al (2001) “In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15
Small-Scale Societies”, American Economic Review 91: 73-8.
[28] khwaja.a (2003) Can Good Projects Succeed in Bad Communities? Collective Action in
the Himalayas, mimeo, Harvard University.
[29] la ferrara.e (2002) “Inequality and Group Participation: Theory and Evidence from
Rural Tanzania”, Journal of Public Economics, 85: 235-73.
[30] lam.w.f (1998), Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, Infrastructure, and
Collective Action, ICS Press, Oakland: California.
[31] ledyard.j (1995) “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research” in Kagel.J, Roth.A
(eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
111-94.
[32] list.j (2004) “Young, Selfish, and Male: Field Evidence of Social Preferences”, Economic
Journal 114: 121-49.
[33] masclet.d, c.noussair, s.tucker, and m-c.villeval (2003) “Monetary and Nonmon-
etary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism”, American Economic Review
93: 366-80.
[34] olson.m (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge:
Massachusetts.
[35] ostrom.e (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action, Cambridge University Press: New York.
[36] ostrom.e, j.m.walker, and r.gardner (1992). “Covenants With andWithout a Sword:
Self—governance is Possible”, American Political Science Review, 86: 404-17.
[37] ostrom.e, r.gardner, and j.m.walker (1994) Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Re-
sources, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: Michigan.
[38] pande.r (2003) “Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Dis-
advantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India”, American Economic Review 93:
1132-51.
23
[39] sefton.m, r.shupp, and j.m.walker (2001) The Eﬀects of Rewards and Sanctions in
the Provision of Public Goods, mimeo, Indiana University.
[40] silverman.b.w (1986)Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis, London: Chap-
man and Hall.
[41] tang.s.y (1992) Institutions and Collective Action: Self—governance in Irrigation, Institute
for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco.
[42] tang.s.y (1994) “Institutions and Performance in Irrigation Systems”, in Ostrom.E, Gard-
ner.R, and Walker.J.M (eds.), Rules, Games, and Common—pool Resources, University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: Michigan.
[43] wade.r (1988) Village Republics: Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South In-
dia, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
24
Figure 1: Distribution of Productivity (kg/hr) by Incentive Scheme
Figure 2: Semi-parametric Kernel Density Estimate of Group Size on 
Individual Productivity Under Relative Incentives
Notes: The kernel density estimates in figure 1 are calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel, based on 50 grid points and 
the bandwidth suggested by Silverman (1986, pp38-40).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Incentive Scheme
Mean, standard deviations in parentheses
 Relative Incentives Piece Rates
5.01 7.98
(3.21) (3.81)
41.1 38.1
(28.8) (18.2)
.175 .156
(.192) (.150)
7.80 6.20
(9.93) (5.97)
.142 .116
(.035) (.041)
.297 .291
(.068) (.067)
.390 .340
(.184) (.162)
Mean cost of effort
Share of workers on the internship programme
Share of total workers of same nationality as worker i
Worker productivity (kg/hr)
Group size
Number of workers of same nationality as worker i
Standard deviation of cost of effort
Notes: Worker productivity is measured at the worker-field-day level. All other variables  are measured at the field-day level. Group 
size equals the total number of pickers on the field-day. The cost of effort parameter is calibrated for each worker as discussed in 
Bandiera et al  (2004b). All characteristics except the share of interns do not differ significantly across the two incentive schemes.
Table 2: Group Characteristics and Cooperation - Group Size and Heterogeneity in Nationalities
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour per field-day)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level
                      
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b)
Group size   .233** .064
(.109) (.067)
 -.175* -.038
(.102) (.065)
  .277** .087
(.123) (.082)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .4077 .4082 .3163 .3165
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 4063 4063 6152 6152
 Relative Incentives  Piece Rates
Share of total workers of same nationality as 
worker i
Number of workers of same nationality as 
worker i
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for clustering at the field-day level. All 
continuous variables are in logs. The sample is restricted to workers who have worked at least 10 field-days under both incentive schemes. Other controls 
include worker experience, field life cycle, and a linear time trend.
Table 3: Group Characteristics and Cooperation - Heterogeneity in Ability
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour per field-day)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level
                      
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2a) (3a)
SD of cost of effort   .561** -.202
(.252) (.177)
In bottom 5% of cost of effort distribution on field-day    .226*** -.035
(.091) (.056)
In top 5% of cost of effort distribution on field-day -.009 .019
(.088) (.058)
Mean cost of effort .014 .382 .412 -.328   -.616***    -.621***
(.452) (.490) (.492) (.347) (.201) (.199)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .4056 .3981 .3966 .3289 .3282 .3282
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 4062 4063 4063 6150 6152 6152
 Relative Incentives  Piece Rates
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for clustering at the field-day level. All 
continuous variables are in logs. The sample is restricted to workers who have worked at least 10 field-days under both incentive schemes. Other controls include 
worker experience, field life cycle, and a linear time trend.  
Table 4: Group Characteristics and Cooperation - Heterogeneity in Stakes
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilogram picked per hour per field-day)
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at field-day level
                      
(1a) (2a) Not on internship (1b)
(2b) Not on 
internship
   .377***    .521*** -.021 -.125
(.106) (.108) (.118) (.111)
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Field fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .4278 .3858 .3035 .3423
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 3984 1042 5913 1894
Share of workers on the field-day that are 
on the internship programme
 Relative Incentives  Piece Rates
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Robust standard errors are calculated throughout, allowing for clustering at the field-
day level. All continuous variables are in logs. Other controls include worker experience, field life cycle, and a linear time trend. The samples in 
columns 1a and 2a are restricted to workers who have worked at least 10 field-days under both incentive schemes. The samples in columns 2a and 
2b are further restricted to only include workers that are not on the internship programme.
